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The Twice and Future President 
Revisited: Of Three-Term Presidents and 
Constitutional End Runs 
Bruce G. Peabody† 
On July 26, 2016, just a few hours after former Secretary of 
State Hillary Rodham Clinton had been formally chosen to be 
her party’s presidential nominee, former President Bill Clinton 
made the case for his wife’s qualifications for the office.1 On the 
following evening, sitting President Barack Obama addressed 
the same Democratic National Convention and argued that 
“there has never been a man or a woman . . . more qualified 
than Hillary Clinton to serve as President of the United States 
of America.”2 Besides their common support for Secretary 
Clinton, an underlying constitutional presumption linked the 
appearances of these past and present Presidents: whatever the 
future held for Mr. Clinton and Mr. Obama, it would surely not 
include additional terms as President of the United States. 
In fact, Secretary Clinton had previously commented that 
while the notion of choosing her husband to be Vice President 
had “crossed [her] mind,” her understanding that he could 
never “succeed to the position” of President made such a choice 
infeasible.3 “He would be good” as Vice President, Secretary 
Clinton stated, “but he’s not eligible, under the Constitution.”4 
 
†   Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson University. The 
author thanks Sandy Levinson, David Rosen, Tori Rosen, Seth Barrett 
Tillman, and especially Brian Kalt and John Schiemann for their close 
readings of earlier drafts of this manuscript and their many helpful comments. 
The author also credits Scott E. Gant for the initial idea of twice and future 
Presidents, and for much of the research and analysis in the original 1999 
piece, which he co-authored. Copyright © 2016 by Bruce G. Peabody. 
 1. Patrick Healy & Jonathan Martin, Democrats Make Hillary Clinton a 
Historic Nominee, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
07/27/us/politics/dnc-speakers-sanders-clinton.html?_r=0. 
 2. U.S. President, President Obama Addresses the Democratic 
Convention (CNN Live Event/Special July 27, 2016), http://transcripts.cnn 
.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1607/27/se.05.html. 
 3. Tom LoBianco, Hillary Clinton: Bill as VP Has “Crossed Her Mind,” 
CNN (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/14/politics/hillary-clinton 
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In turn, after President Obama’s DNC remarks, CNN 
correspondent Jake Tapper stated that the gathered audience 
was “emotional and sad about the fact” that the incumbent 
President would be leaving office in 2017. Indeed, Tapper noted 
that someone in the Convention shouted “four more years” in 
the midst of President Obama’s remarks, expressing a 
widespread wish among Democrats “even though, of course, 
that would be, constitutionally, against the law.”5 
Hillary Clinton and Jake Tapper’s respective conclusions 
that neither Bill Clinton nor Barack Obama were 
constitutionally permitted to serve again in the office of the 
President is shared by many pundits and scholars.6 The 
primary legal basis for this judgment is found in the U.S. 
Constitution’s Twenty-Second Amendment, which stipulates 
that “[n]o person shall be elected to the office of the President 
more than twice.”7 
But this position is not obviously correct. In 1999, when 
President Bill Clinton’s second term was drawing to a close, the 
Minnesota Law Review published “The Twice and Future 
President: Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second 
Amendment.”8 In that article, I anticipated the possibility of 
 
-bill-clinton-vice-president; see also Sally Bedell Smith, Two Presidents in the 
White House?, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/two 
-presidents-in-the-white-house-1463570533 (discussing the close working 
relationship of the two Clintons). 
 4. LoBianco, supra note 3. 
 5. President Obama Addresses the National Convention (CNN Live 
Event/Special July 27, 2016), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1607/ 
27/se.05.html. 
 6. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 
YALE L.J. 453, 491 (1989) (“[T]he Twenty-Second Amendment forbade the 
President from seeking a third elected term in office.”); Richard Albert, The 
Constitutional Politics of Presidential Succession, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 497, 
565 (2011) (“[A] former two-term President is not eligible” to serve as Vice 
President); Matthew J. Franck, Constitutional Sleight of Hand, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE (July 31, 2007), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/51444/ 
constitutional-sleight-hand-matthew-j-franck (arguing that President Clinton 
cannot become Vice President under the Twelfth Amendment); Alexander 
Mallin, Why President Obama Says He Wouldn’t Want to Run for a Third 
Term, ABC NEWS (Jan 24, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-
obama-run-term/story?id=36488844 (discussing whether Obama would seek a 
third term if it wasn’t “prohibited under the 22nd Amendment to the 
Constitution”). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
 8. Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: 
Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. 
REV. 565 (1999). 
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twice-elected Presidents serving as Vice President or filling 
other roles that might allow them to serve again in the office of 
President.9 I concluded that these scenarios were neither 
constitutionally prohibited nor politically fanciful. 
The issues posed by the original article are ripe for 
reexamination today. To begin with, media and political 
speculation about Bill Clinton’s role in a possible Hillary 
Clinton White House10 is widespread, ongoing, and relevant: no 
previous U.S. administration has faced the extraordinary 
prospect of having a former President returning to the White 
House in a non-presidential capacity. Moreover, since the end 
of his second term, media and other commenters have mused 
about Bill Clinton’s political future and whether he could serve 
as President again despite existing constitutional restrictions.11 
In the case of President Obama, these issues are arguably 
even more pertinent since he is fifteen years younger than Bill 
Clinton while remaining popular in his party. Although 
President Obama has said he wouldn’t run for a third term 
even if he could,12 questions about his continuing public service 
and potential role in subsequent administrations will surely 
surface in the years ahead.13 
 
 9. Throughout this essay, “twice-elected” will generally refer to both 
Presidents elected twice and President’s elected once who also serve “more 
than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President” 
(which the Twenty-Second Amendment equates to an election). The original 
Twice and Future President article was co-authored with Scott E. Gant, but for 
purposes of consistency and simplicity I shall use first person pronouns in 
referencing authorship of both the original article and this current essay. 
 10. Maeve Reston & Sunlen Serfaty, Bill Clinton Embraces Role of 
Political Spouse, CNN (July 27, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/26/politics/ 
bill-clinton-democratic-convention-speech. 
 11. Tom Curry, Could Bill Clinton Be Vice President?, MSNBC (Feb. 20, 
2008), http://www.msnbc.com/id/23254868; Jack Shafer, Vice President Bill 
Clinton? Take 3, SLATE (Sept. 7, 2000), http://slate.msn.com/toolbar 
.aspx?action=print&id=1006013; Tony Mauro, Would the Constitution Prevent 
a Gore-Clinton Ticket?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 21, 2000, at 7; see also 
Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 857 
(2005) (discussing media interest in Clinton as Vice President). 
 12. Mallin, supra note 6. 
 13. Since 1951 (when the Twenty-Second Amendment was ratified), 
almost every twice-elected President has generated some chatter about their 
suitability for a third term; Richard Nixon is one obvious exception. Twice-
elected President George W. Bush left office with relatively low public 
approval, and has not been linked to the vice presidency, but recent polling 
indicates that his popularity is on the rise (although still substantially below 
Bill Clinton’s). See Philip Bump, George W. Bush Now Polls Better than 
Hillary Clinton and Obama, WASH. POST (June 3, 2015), https://www 
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“The Twice and Future President” was the first sustained 
and systematic examination of the application of the Twenty-
Second Amendment to twice-elected Presidents who might 
again assume the presidency. Since the publication of that 
pioneering piece, however, a number of scholars have 
subsequently considered, challenged, and added to its basic 
claims and arguments.14 As Richard Albert puts it, since the 
start of the twenty-first century, “lawyers, scholars, and lay 
persons alike have debated whether the Constitution permits—
and, if it does, whether it should permit—the vice presidency to 
serve as a vehicle through which a two-term President might 
ascend to the Presidency for a third term.”15 While one might 
think such a basic constitutional question could be readily 
addressed, instead it has prompted a “simmering 
disagreement” among the attorneys, judges, academicians, and 
political figures who have considered this matter.16 
This updated essay reexamines the basic claims in the 
“Twice and Future President” article, drawing on subsequent 
scholarship and criticism, some of which has explicitly engaged 
the original argument. “The Twice and Future President 
Revisited” highlights important fault lines in the ongoing 
debate about the scope and application of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment, considers the most serious challenges to the view 
that a President can serve in three (or more) terms, and 
discusses the wider significance of these ideas. 
More specifically, this essay proceeds in five major parts. 
First, Part I reviews the most important claims in the original 
“Twice and Future President” article which identified different 
scenarios through which a twice-elected President might again 
serve as President. Next, Part II examines the most essential 
scholarly counter-arguments that the 1999 piece anticipated, 




 14. See Michael C. Dorf, The Case for a Gore-Clinton Ticket, FINDLAW 
(July 31, 2000), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20000731.html; Stephen 
Gillers, The Next Best Thing to Being President, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/03/opinion/the-next-best-thing-to-being 
-president.html?_r=0; Joshua Spivak, Bill Clinton for Vice President? Forget 
It., HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 22, 2004), http://hnn.us/articles/4165.html. 
 15. Albert, supra note 11, at 857. 
 16. Peter Baker, VP Bill? Depends on Meaning of “Elected,” WASH. POST 
(Oct. 20, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/ 
10/19/AR2006101901572.html. 
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could indeed serve as President in more than two terms. Part 
III of this essay considers substantial, new, unanticipated 
arguments that have been advanced in recent years. Part IV 
reflects on the broader significance of this debate, contending 
that the prospect of a “twice and future president” is more than 
an academic abstraction or “parlor game,”17 but instead has 
important political and policy implications. In the fifth and 
final part, this essay concludes by offering several reflections 
on whether the U.S. Constitution might simply be amended to 
address the problems raised by three-term Presidents, and 
introduces the related concept of “constitutional end runs.” 
I.  THE ORIGINAL ARGUMENT: THE TWICE AND FUTURE 
PRESIDENT   
To a significant degree, the original argument was based 
on the Constitution’s text. As I argued in 1999, the language of 
the Twenty-Second Amendment: 
[R]estricts only reelection of an already twice-elected President. The 
words themselves do not (1) limit the amount of time, consecutively or 
cumulatively, a person may serve, or (2) proscribe such a person from 
reassuming the Office of President by means other than election.18 
These observations are significant given that the 
Constitution explicitly anticipates numerous means through 
which a person might become President or “act” as President 
even without being elected to that office. Succession to the 
office of President through the vice presidency is perhaps the 
most obvious, but overall, the original article identified six 
basic scenarios through which a twice-elected President could 
again become Commander in Chief.19 Scenarios 1 and 2 
involved twice-elected Presidents serving as Vice Presidents 
who then either became or acted as President following the 
removal, death, resignation, impeachment, or disability of the 
elected President. Scenarios 3 and 4 considered circumstances 
where a Vice President-elect might become or act as President 
if the President-elect died before assuming office or if a 
President-elect was not ultimately chosen or deemed qualified 
for the office. Scenario 5 focused on statutory succession laws 
which might name a former, twice-elected President to serve as 
President, and Scenario 6 concerned a House selection of a 
 
 17. Id. (discussing constitutional “parlor games” involving Bill Clinton’s 
role in a Hillary Clinton administration). 
 18. Peabody & Gant, supra note 8, at 613 (citations omitted). 
 19. Id. at 568–69. 
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twice-elected President under the terms of the Twelfth 
Amendment under circumstances where no person was able to 
secure a majority of electoral college votes. 
As a corroboration of the textual case for these six 
scenarios, I extensively probed the legislative history of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment (including discussions of early 
versions of the amendment, congressional arguments about 
how to interpret the final, adopted language, and the sparse 
ratification debates). While I found no clear-cut evidence that 
the amendment’s authors and supporters consciously wished to 
leave open a three-term President “loophole,” many lawmakers 
clearly understood that their final language restricting persons 
“elected to the office of the President” did not foreclose other 
mechanisms for filling the presidency. 
II.  ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS BY CRITICS AND 
RESPONSES   
The original “Twice and Future President” article 
anticipated objections to these basic textual, historical, and 
structural arguments—objections that have since been raised 
and refined by legal scholars and other commentators. 
A. THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT 
The Twelfth Amendment has been perhaps the most 
important and recurring source of criticism of the original 
Minnesota Law Review argument. This amendment states that 
“no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President 
shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United 
States.”20 Scholars have offered three different readings of this 
“Ineligibility Clause” in order to make sense of how it applies to 
the Twenty-Second Amendment generally, and the problem of 
presidential succession specifically.21 
 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend XII. The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 
identifies the line of succession after the Vice President but stipulates that it 
only applies “to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the 
Constitution.” 3 U.S.C. § 19. Even though scholars have raised questions 
about the constitutionality of the law, for the purposes of this essay, one can 
treat this “eligibility” language as raising the same issues as those posed by 
the Twelfth Amendment. 
 21. See Dan T. Coenen, Two-Time Presidents and the Vice-Presidency, 56 
B.C. L. Rev. 1287, 1293–1331 (2015) (discussing various ways to construe the 
Twelfth Amendment and its “ineligibility” provision). Coenen’s analysis of 
third-term Presidents is the most thorough and nuanced scholarship on the 
issue to date. 
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In the first view, the “constitutionally ineligible” language 
of the Twelfth Amendment refers to any constitutional 
restrictions that prevent a person from serving as President 
through any means. Thus, the Twelfth Amendment’s language 
surely encompasses the “eligibility” provisions of Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 5, which are the minimum qualifications 
needed to serve as President; these include being a “natural 
born citizen,” at least thirty-five years old, and a U.S. resident 
for fourteen or more years. Under this reading, a thirty-four 
year old, no matter how distinguished, charismatic, or worldly, 
would clearly be barred from the vice presidency under the 
terms of the Twelfth Amendment and Article II.22 Such a view 
of the Twelfth Amendment is supported by noting that 
“because presidential and vice presidential candidates were not 
formally distinguished” before ratification of the amendment, 
“anyone elected Vice President was also qualified to be 
President.”23 Once the Twelfth Amendment became law, 
however, these individuals were selected through different 
electoral procedures and the need to ensure their simultaneous 
qualification for the office of President became necessary. 
Drawing on this interpretation, one might contend that the 
Twenty-Second Amendment effectively added to the 
Ineligibility Clause by putting restrictions on twice-elected 
Presidents.24 Stated differently, perhaps the Twenty-Second 
Amendment expanded our understanding of who is ineligible to 
the vice presidency by adding twice-elected Presidents to this 
prohibited category. 
The original “Twice and Future President” rejected this 
argument on the grounds that the Twenty-Second Amendment 
eschews the Twelfth Amendment’s general language of 
ineligibility in favor of focusing specifically on restricting 
 
 22. Another attribute that seems applicable to the Twelfth Amendment’s 
Ineligibility Clause is impeachment. It appears reasonable to stipulate that a 
President who is impeached and removed from office is ineligible to the office 
of President (at least for the impacted term) and is also, therefore, ineligible to 
be Vice President. 
 23. Peabody & Gant, supra note 8, at 618. 
 24. After all, the Fourteenth Amendment arguably supplemented the 
Article II restrictions by barring individuals from serving in “any office, civil or 
military, under the United States” if they previously swore an official oath to 
support the Constitution but then engaged in “insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or [gave] aid and comfort to the enemies thereof.” While this 
provision originally targeted officers in the states of the Confederacy it could, 
presumably, also apply to contemporary disloyal rebels and insurrectionaries. 
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elected Presidents.25 A twice-elected President is surely 
ineligible, under the terms of the Twenty-Second Amendment, 
to be elected President again, but she is not obviously 
“ineligible” to serve as President through other means.26 
Conspicuous here is the parallel “eligible” language in the 
Twelfth Amendment and Article II—language that is not 
present in the Twenty-Second Amendment.27 
The 1999 “Twice and Future President” article drove this 
point home by drawing on the legislative history surrounding 
the Twenty-Second Amendment, demonstrating that the 
amendment’s authors considered more comprehensive language 
(that would have made twice-elected President ineligible for the 
presidency) which they subsequently and clearly rejected.28 As 
the scholar Dan Coenen concludes: 
It is strained in the extreme to say that the Twenty-Second 
Amendment established a rule of ineligibility for purposes of the 
Twelfth Amendment when Congress, in forging the final version of 
the Twenty-Second Amendment, chose to jettison the very language 
on which the argument for ineligibility based on the Twelfth 
Amendment hinges.29 
Notwithstanding this view, some scholars advance an 
alternate, second reading of the Twelfth Amendment and its 
relationship to the Twenty-Second Amendment. In this 
conception, the word “eligible” refers implicitly to elections. In 
other words, under this approach, the Twenty-Second 
Amendment should be understood to say, in effect, that “no 
person unelectable to the office of President shall be elected to 
the office of Vice-President of the United States.” 
Two proponents of this point of view are the scholars Akhil 
Amar and Eugene Volokh. Amar defends his position with an 
 
 25. Peabody & Gant, supra note 8, at 597. 
 26. See Dorf, supra note 14 (a twice-elected President “is not ineligible to 
the office of President . . . . He is only disqualified (by the Twenty-Second 
Amendment) from being elected to that office.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 27. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788 
(1999) (discussing an intratextual interpretive approach in which we read “the 
words of the Constitution in a dramatically different order, placing textually 
nonadjoining clauses side by side for careful analysis”). 
 28. Peabody & Gant, supra note 8, at 597. 
 29. See Coenen supra note 21, at 1300. One of the “jettisoned” early 
versions of the Twenty-Second Amendment barred any person from being 
chosen or serving “as President of the United States for any term, or be[ing] 
eligible to hold the office of President during any term, if such person shall 
have heretofore served as President during the whole or any part of each of 
any two separate terms.” Peabody & Gant, supra note 8, at 593. 
  
2016] TWICE & FUTURE PRESIDENT REVISITED 129 
 
etymological approach, noting “that the words ‘eligible’ and 
‘electable’ spring from the same Latin root, and that standard 
dictionaries have long included ‘electable’ as one of the 
traditional definitions of eligible.”30 Volokh’s analysis is similar, 
although perhaps more explicitly originalist insofar as he 
argues that eligible and electable were basically 
interchangeable terms as “understood in 1804,” when the 
Twelfth Amendment was ratified. As he sees it, since a twice-
elected President has no “capacity to be elected” President 
again under the Twenty-Second amendment, this lack of 
electoral eligibility renders her unfit to be Vice President as 
well.31 
One might begin by noting that such readings of the 
Twelfth Amendment, even if sound, only prohibit some 
scenarios though which a twice-elected President might again 
serve as President. Again, if we accept that eligibility subsumes 
the concept of election, then the Twenty-Second Amendment 
can be effectively rewritten to say that “no person unelectable 
to the office of President shall be elected to the office of Vice-
President of the United States.” Even under this reading, 
however, a twice-elected President could still assume the vice 
presidency through non-electoral means (such as via 
nomination, which might occur if the regularly elected Vice 
President dies, resigns, or is impeached and removed), or could 
succeed to the presidency through a statute (as authorized by 
Article II of the Constitution and the Twentieth Amendment).32 
 
 30. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 622 n.8 
(2006). 
 31. See Eugene Volokh, Bill Clinton for Vice-President?, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 19, 2006, 1:30 PM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/ 
1150738214.shtml. 
 32. An originalist and historical orientation might contend that the 
Twelfth Amendment’s language about vice presidential eligibility implies that 
elections were the only basis for becoming Vice President. In this view, at the 
time the Twelfth Amendment was ratified, there was no basis for 
distinguishing between eligibility to be elected Vice President and eligibility to 
serve as Vice President (because election was the only mechanism for 
becoming Vice President—since the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which covered 
vice presidential nominations, wouldn’t be ratified for another 163 years). 
Such an approach arguably ignores the provisions of Article II, Section 1 and 
the Twelfth Amendment which stipulate conditions under which the Senate 
shall choose a Vice President, circumstances that do not obviously equate with 
election. But cf. Brian C. Kalt, Don’t Kill the Candidate: Remedying Congress’s 
Failure to Use Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment, HARV. J. LEG. 
(forthcoming 2016). In any event, whatever the framers of the Twelfth 
Amendment understood about the mechanisms for vice presidential selection, 
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Moreover, there are several shortcomings with the “eligible 
means election” approach.33 To begin with, proponents of this 
view must presumably understand Vice Presidential eligibility 
under the Twelfth Amendment to also include the qualification 
requirements of Article II, Section I, Clause 5 (Presidents must 
be a natural-born citizen, thirty-five years old, and have 
fourteen years of U.S. residency). Otherwise, this 
interpretation of the Twelfth would seem to leave open the odd 
possibility that one could assume the presidency through non-
electoral means without being bound by this qualification 
language.34 But once we “fold in” the qualification 
requirements, the Twelfth Amendment becomes something like 
this: “[T]o be eligible to be Vice President a person must be 
electable as President.” 
But such a move muddies the waters, and detracts from 
the basic claim that eligibility and electability should be 
understood as being roughly the same. Moreover, this 
construction is somewhat odd and even strained given the 
parallel (ineligible-eligible) language in the Twelfth 
Amendment. Why would the President’s “ineligibility” refer 
just to the qualification language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 
5,35 while the “eligibility” of the Vice President would refer to 
 
such expectations were clearly modified by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
which provided for nominations to resolve vacancies in the office of the Vice 
President. 
 33. See Coenen, supra note 21, at 1318–20 (discussing what he calls the 
“electoral-ineligibility interpretation”). 
 34. Of course, in other contexts the Constitution imposes requirements for 
filling an office that apply only at the time of election. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to 
the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United 
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in 
which he shall be chosen.” (emphasis added)). Thus, some constitutional 
requirements only apply at the time of election, while other requirements go 
directly to the question of eligibility to be elected or to take or hold office. See 
Brian Kalt, Can the Senate Refuse to Seat Blagojevich’s Appointee?, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Dec. 30, 2008), https://concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2008/12/can_the_senate.html. A strong case can be made that 
“eligibility” extends at least to “eligibility to be elected, if not also to holding 
the office.” See generally Seth Barrett Tillman, Who Can Be President of the 
United States?: Candidate Hillary Clinton and the Problem of Statutory 
Qualifications, 5 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 95, 9771 n.1 (2016) (discussing the 
theoretical difference between “qualifications” and “eligibility requirements”). 
 35. Presidential constitutional “ineligibility” under the Twelfth 
Amendment can’t prohibit non-electoral means to the office since that would 
prevent Vice Presidents from becoming or acting as President. Therefore, the 
“eligible means election” approach seems to apply the (in)eligibility language 
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these provisions plus the requirement that a Vice President be 
electable to the presidency?36 
In addition, it seems pertinent that the “constitutional 
ineligibility” language of the Twelfth Amendment occurs at the 
very end of the amendment, immediately after a discussion of 
the procedure through which the Senate will “choose the Vice-
President,” in circumstances where the presumptive Vice 
President is unable to secure a majority in the electoral college. 
If the Twelfth Amendment’s reference to constitutional 
eligibility was really focused on electability, its syntactic 
placement (in the same clause discussing a non-electoral 
procedure) seems peculiar at best.37 Finally, one should note the 
obvious: the constitutional text references “elections” and 
“eligibility” as distinct words, and in ways that are not 
obviously fungible.38 
A third and final interpretation of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment in light of the Twelfth Amendment adopts the 
view that any twice-elected President is wholly ineligible to be 
President, and, therefore such a person is also ineligible to be 
Vice President under the terms of the Twelfth.39 As Matthew 
Franck puts it: 
Since the ordinary path to the presidency contemplated by the 
Constitution is via the ballots of . . . electors, then by any ordinary 
 
differently for Presidents and Vice Presidents. 
 36. The best response is probably to argue that the framers of the Twelfth 
Amendment understood that election covered all means through which a Vice 
President assumed the office of Vice President, but, as discussed above, this 
hardly resolves the matter. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 37. The specific, concluding language of the Twelfth Amendment is this: 
The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole 
number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then 
from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the 
Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number 
shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally 
ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-
President of the United States. 
U.S. CONST. art. XII, cl. 1. Arguably, the “[b]ut no” phrasing implies that the 
eligibility restrictions are pertinent to the Senate’s choice of Vice President, a 
linkage which would seem to weaken the Posner-Volokh “eligibility as 
election” understanding. 
 38. See Coenen, supra note 21, at 1318 (arguing that the “electoral-
ineligibility interpretation . . . stretches the text of the Twelfth Amendment 
beyond the breaking point”). 
 39. See LoBianco, supra note 3 (discussing Hillary Clinton making a 
similar argument about her husband’s vice presidential eligibility). 
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mode of legal reasoning, the 22nd Amendment changed the answer to 
the question—who is “constitutionally ineligible to the office of 
President”? . . . Now the class includes aliens, immigrants, citizens 
under 35, others failing the residency requirement, and persons 
previously elected twice (or having served one term elected and more 
than half of another’s term after succeeding from the vice 
presidency—another requirement of the 22nd Amendment).40 
Such a view is probably best defended through a kind of 
functional analysis. Elections are the ordinary means through 
which we select Presidents, and serve, in turn, as a pivotal 
basis for their political and institutional power. Under the 
terms of the Twenty-Second Amendment, a twice-elected 
President is barred from accessing this signature means to the 
presidency. A twice-elected President, therefore, might be 
understood as ineligible for both the presidency and vice 
presidency, because the main attribute of a Vice President is 
her capacity to serve as President of the United States through 
elections. As Franck summarizes, because a twice-elected 
President is constitutionally ineligible “to be elected president” 
he or she is also “ineligible to become president by another 
route. He is, in short, ineligible to be president, and therefore 
ineligible to become vice president under the 12th 
amendment.”41 
But adopting this position appears to depend on circular 
logic or miss the broader point: people can become President 
through electoral as well as non-electoral means. Even if they 
are prohibited by the Twenty-Second Amendment from 
assuming the presidency through the former process, it is not 
obvious why they are precluded from the latter. And, therefore, 
the Twelfth Amendment’s broad talk of “constitutionally 
ineligible” Vice Presidents seems largely irrelevant to twice-
elected Presidents.42 
One might again counter that since elections serve as the 
most important (and ordinary) means through which people 
become President, it is reasonable to include other, 
 
 40. See Franck, supra note 6. 
 41. Id.; see also Albert, supra note 6, at 565 (indicating that the vice 
presidency “is an office for which a former two-term President is not eligible”); 
Volokh, supra note 31 (“[I]t would seem that a two-term incumbent is 
‘ineligible’ to the Presidency . . . precisely because he is made unelectable to 
that office.”). 
 42. Of course, if my judgment is wrong, that is, if twice-elected Presidents 
are barred under the Twenty-Second Amendment from serving in the office of 
President, then they are also prohibited from being eligible for the vice 
presidency under the terms of the Twelfth Amendment. 
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presumptively less important, non-electoral mechanisms within 
the prohibitions of the Twenty-Second and Twelfth 
Amendments. But this idea, that a primary constitutional 
mechanism subsumes secondary mechanisms, is not an obvious 
rule of legal construction. Indeed “secondary mechanisms” 
(such as, say, the recess appointment power) are set out as 
independent alternatives precisely because they aren’t implicit 
in existing powers.43 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES 
In addition to the Twelfth Amendment’s Ineligibility 
Clause, claims about the purposes underlying the Twenty-
Second Amendment (and other constitutional provisions) have 
provided another major line of attack for those skeptical that 
twice-elected Presidents can again serve in the office of 
President.44 
More than thirty-five years ago, John Hart Ely famously 
criticized “clause bound-interpretivism” in which “judges 
deciding constitutional issues . . . confine themselves to 
enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the 
written Constitution,” often by focusing on passages in 
isolation.45 Scholars like Franck have decried a similar, narrow, 
literal tack in construing the Twenty-Second Amendment.46 In 
 
 43. Moreover, non-electoral presidential succession is not always 
“secondary” to presidential election as a political matter. When William Henry 
Harrison died in only his thirty-second day in office, Article II, Section 1, 
Clause 6 provided that Vice President John Tyler would succeed him, although 
the exact nature of this transfer of authority was contested. See BRIAN C. 
KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS AND 
THEIR ENEMIES 65 (2012). But surely in 1841, this non-electoral basis for 
power was ultimately more important in filling the office of President (and 
shaping the course of American history) than the mechanisms of the electoral 
college. 
 44. Id. at 144 (“The notion that a constitutional provision should be 
interpreted in a way that vindicates its intended purpose is a powerful one in 
American law.”); see also Coenen, supra note 21, at 1308–14 (considering a 
“purpose-based analysis” of the Constitution’s application to twice-elected 
Presidents). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between 
Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the 
Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgments Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
685, 718 (2014) (discussing the theory of purposivism in statutory 
interpretation). 
 45. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 1 (1980). 
 46. Franck, supra note 6 (objecting to treating the words of the 
Constitution “in isolation from one another, rather than as parts of a whole 
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order to avoid lapsing to a mere academic diversion, in which 
professors “fiddle around with the text of the Constitution until 
we make readers believe it means the opposite of what it 
[actually] says,” Franck proposes that we adopt an 
understanding of the Twenty-Second Amendment (and Twelfth 
Amendment) that treats these provisions “as parts of a whole 
that has an integrated meaning and purpose.”47 
Among other advantages, such a purposive (and structural) 
approach enables constitutional interpreters to circumvent 
crabbed or overly formal readings of the text that, while 
logically consistent, yield purportedly troubling outcomes.48 As 
Brian Kalt explains, some “constitutional interpreters often 
prefer a ‘second-best’ reading of the text that vindicates a 
provision’s purpose, over a reading that parses the text 
perfectly while missing the point of the provision.”49 
Applying this sort of a purposive orientation to the Twenty-
Second Amendment might lead us to conclude that the 
“amendment’s drafters [simply] wanted to send presidents 
home after two terms.”50 If we subsequently parse the text and 
arrive at a legal conclusion with a different result, we run the 
risk of making “the amendment accomplish the exact opposite 
of what it was supposed to.”51 In a related vein, Bruce 
Ackerman cautions that instead of pursuing “ingenious 
constructions” of the Twenty-Second Amendment that allow 
twice-elected Presidents to once again serve as Chief 
Executives, we should return to the widely understood goals 
driving its proposal and ratification.52 
So what are these objectives, and how do we glean them? 
The original “Twice and Future President” answered these 
questions by focusing on the legislative history and intent 
 
that has an integrated meaning and purpose”); see also Albert, supra note 11, 
at 857–59 (arguing against narrow clause-bound textualist analysis). 
 47. Franck, supra note 6. 
 48. See Albert, supra note 11, at 857–59 (arguing against a “myopic” 
interpretation of the Constitution in favor of a “proper, holistic reading” that 
would bar “a two-term President” from again becoming President). 
 49. KALT, supra note 43, at 144. 
 50. Id. at 6. 
 51. Id. at 143. 
 52. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 204 n.34 (2006); see also KALT, supra note 
43, at 144 (arguing that we need to focus on the purpose or “point” of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment). Kalt does not privilege what I am calling 
constitutional purposivism, but does give the modality a fair and nuanced 
application to the Twenty-Second Amendment. 
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behind the Twenty-Second Amendment and by considering 
whether a three-term President would somehow violate the 
“spirit” of the amendment or the Constitution as a whole.53 
Scholars have subsequently offered what amount to three 
specific approaches to construing the purposes of the Twenty-
Second Amendment. 
First, one might try to define the goals of the amendment54 
by focusing on the immediate political and historical concerns 
that spurred its proposal and ratification, namely, preventing 
another FDR. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected 
to an unprecedented four consecutive terms, and there is little 
doubt that this accomplishment alarmed many of the officials 
and commentators who advocated for a post-FDR limit to 
presidential service. As Coenen puts it, Roosevelt clearly 
“framed the thinking of every political representative who was 
called on to consider the Twenty-Second Amendment.”55 
This pragmatic recognition of the actual impetus behind 
the amendment is somewhat appealing, but raises a number of 
problems. To begin with, seeing the Twenty-Second 
Amendment as largely an anti-Roosevelt initiative doesn’t 
clearly delimit what part of his legacy was offensive. Was it the 
President’s violation of an alleged, informal two-term 
tradition?56 Was it the fact that he served for four consecutive 
terms? Or was it something broader, such as a more 
thoroughgoing abuse of executive power? The Republican Party 
Platform of 1948 seemed to endorse this last view, as it 
congratulated Congress for battling against a “trend of 
extravagant and ill-advised Executive action” and imposing a 
 
 53. Peabody & Gant, supra note 8, at 614–17, 627–33. 
 54. Identifying the “goals of the amendment” might involve at least two 
intertwined tasks: identifying what the authors and supporters of the 
amendment intended to say (that is what did they think the legal language 
would accomplish) and examining what they intended to accomplish (what 
broader political and institutional changes they thought would occur as a 
result of this language). While, obviously, it can be difficult to distinguish 
these two strands, for those purposivists who insist that some portion of legal 
language doesn’t really mean what it says (or, at least, isn’t self-evident in its 
meaning) focusing on what the legal drafters intended to accomplish may help 
us determine what they intended to say. Thanks to Brian Kalt for this 
distinction. 
 55. Coenen, supra note 21, at 1307. 
 56. See Bruce G. Peabody, George Washington, Presidential Term Limits, 
and the Problem of Reluctant Political Leadership, 31 PRES. STUD. Q. 439, 440 
(2001) (“Conventional popular and even scholarly accounts of the two-term 
tradition confuse . . . the historical contours of this practice . . . .”). 
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“limitation of Presidential tenure to two terms.”57 One suspects 
that there was no obvious contemporary consensus about what, 
precisely, was core to Roosevelt’s alleged electoral and political 
misdeeds. 
In any event, interpreting the Twenty-Second Amendment 
through the perspective of contemporaneous critics of the four-
term President, doesn’t really address whether twice-elected 
Presidents might someday assume office through non-electoral 
means. As Coenen points out, no advocates for the Twenty-
Second Amendment fretted “about electing a former President 
as Vice-President” because “[t]his possibility was far removed 
from the sort of overreaching that reformers perceived in the 
actions of Franklin Roosevelt.”58 
Perhaps a more promising basis for discovering the true 
purposes of the Twenty-Second Amendment is to return to the 
specific discussions that accompanied its passage and ultimate 
approval. In other words, what objectives did the authors (and 
supporters) of the amendment express while crafting its 
language? As already noted, the original “Twice and Future 
President” analysis covered these issues extensively,59 and 
other scholars have also returned to this history. Without 
rehashing the discussion in full, there are three pertinent 
conclusions we can draw from the proposal and ratification 
debates. 
First, the congressional advocates of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment widely agreed on only generic goals. Many 
members of Congress who supported the amendment concurred 
with some variation of the notion that it was designed to 
 
 57. Republican Party Platform of 1948, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25836 (last visited Nov. 2, 2016). The 
Twenty-Second Amendment was both formally proposed by Congress and sent 
to the states in 1947. It was ratified under the terms of Article V in 1951. See 
DAVID KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995 331 (1996); Peabody & Gant supra note 8, at 598–
99; see also Coenen, supra note 21, at 1310 (discussing the ambiguity of 
Ackerman’s conclusion that the Twenty-Second Amendment was intended to 
prevent a repeat of “Roosevelt’s lengthy stay in the White House”). 
 58. Coenen supra note 21, at 1307–08. Another objection one might make 
to a Roosevelt focused approach to understanding the amendment’s purposes 
is that this privileges the partisan animus that motivated many of the 
supporters of the Twenty Second-Amendment. See Carlos E. Gonzalez, 80 
WASH. U. L.Q. 127, 206 (2002) (“[T]he Twenty-Second Amendment 
demonstrates how party politics can distort the ability of legislative bodies to 
embody We the People.”). 
 59. Peabody & Gant, supra note 8, at 599. 
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prevent anyone “from holding too long the office of Chief 
Executive” (out of fear that this would pave the road to 
entrenched and tyrannical rule).60 Thus, the Senate Report that 
accompanied the amendment called the measure “a reasonable 
restriction on the possibility of an executive dynasty.”61 
Second, and as noted earlier, it seems fair to conclude that 
nothing in the deliberations surrounding the Twenty-Second 
Amendment indicate Congress intended to open the door to a 
future three-term President. That said, there is ample evidence 
that legislators were aware of the constitutional differences 
between elections and other mechanisms for attaining the 
presidency. As Kalt argues, such distinctions were “not subtle” 
and were surely on the minds of many lawmakers. After all, the 
framers of the Twenty-Second Amendment contemplated and 
debated its contours while keenly aware that President 
Truman had entered the White House through non-electoral 
means.62 
Indeed, the third observation one should make about the 
debates that produced the Twenty-Second Amendment is that 
Congress initially considered quite different, and more 
comprehensive legal language, which it subsequently 
abandoned in favor of its ultimate focus on presidential 
elections.63 The initial proposal approved by the full House, for 
 
 60. 93 CONG. REC. 1945 (statement of Sen. Revercomb); see also Peabody 
& Gant, supra note 8, at 614–17; KALT supra note 43, at 134–58. 
 61. S. REP. NO. 80-34, at 2 (1947). Of course, if one takes the “dynasty” 
view seriously, it suggests that a Clinton-Clinton ticket would be more 
reprehensible than, say, a Clinton-Obama ticket. 
 62. See KALT, supra note 43, at 139 (when the amendment was crafted 
“every generation in living memory had featured unelected presidents”). One 
can probably conclude that the framers of the Twenty-Second Amendment 
were, on the whole, aware that their language created “loopholes,” but their 
pragmatic judgment was that it was so unlikely these loopholes would be 
exploited that they thought the “simple” text ultimately adopted was worth 
this risk. See Peabody & Gant, supra note 8, at 595 n.145 (discussing Senator 
Warren Magnuson’s contention that the “simple” language of the amendment 
would help “the people of the United States . . . know what they are voting on 
when it is presented to the States”). 
 63. Some early versions of the Twenty-Second Amendment restricted how 
long a person could “hold the office of President,” perhaps not covering 
individuals who would simply “act” as President, while others unquestionably 
covered both those holding the office and acting as President. But, again, it 
remains difficult to know whether this legislative history points to the true 
concerns of the Twenty-Second Amendment’s authors, or confirms that the 
final language focusing on restricting elections was consciously and carefully 
chosen. KALT, supra note 43, at 140. 
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example, stipulated that “[a]ny person who has served as 
President of the United States during all, or portions, of any 
two terms, shall thereafter be ineligible to hold the office of 
President.”64 This approach would have precluded some if not 
all of the three-term President scenarios discussed in the 
original “Twice and Future President” article.65 But Congress 
ultimately approved the more ambiguous and less 
comprehensive language we know today as the Twenty-Second 
Amendment.66 
Before leaving the purposive argument about the Twenty-
Second Amendment, one might consider a third and final 
approach, one that transcends both a narrow political focus on 
FDR’s opponents as well as a sustained inquiry into the 
intentions of the specific congressional proponents of the law. 
Instead, we might look to popular understandings of the 
amendment. What were the expectations of “ordinary” 
Americans about what the measure was supposed to 
accomplish? This orientation may make particular sense in the 
context of a constitutional amendment, which is a broad-based 
change to a form of law that has a unique and privileged 
relationship with the American people.67 
 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 80-17, at 1 (1947). Coenen notes that one might argue 
that this early comprehensive language in the House signaled the true 
intentions of Congress, but given the ultimate approved language this 
argument appears strained. Coenen, supra note 21, at 1300 (dismissing the 
argument that “the repeated references to eligibility in early incarnations of 
the Amendment demonstrate that the phrase ‘[n]o person shall be elected’ was 
meant to carry forward, rather than to abandon, a principle of ineligibility”). 
 65. The indicated language is not necessarily comprehensive. One might 
argue, for example, that being “ineligible to hold the office of President” is 
different from being able to act as President, a distinction perhaps implied by 
the language of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment which distinguishes 
circumstances where Vice Presidents “become President” and those where a 
VP is “Acting President.” Thanks to Seth Barrett Tillman for this argument. 
 66. What is the explanation for Congress’s shift from the seemingly 
comprehensive language of the House to the election oriented language of the 
actual Twenty-Second Amendment? The legislative history provides no clear 
answer. Political compromise, and the belief of some that the Senate language 
was simpler seem to have been motivating factors. Coenen further makes the 
case that the shift reflected coalition building efforts including less 
encompassing language “was designed to respond to widespread concern about 
the scope of the then-pending draft’s displacement of the preexisting norm of 
voter autonomy in executive branch elections.” Coenen, supra note 21, at 1305. 
 67. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 50–57 
(1986) (describing an “aspirational” understanding of American 
constitutionalism in which the “typical citizen” accepts the supremacy of the 
Constitution as binding on him or herself). 
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Trying to ascertain “the people’s” understanding of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment is at the heart of a number of 
analyses of the amendment’s purposes. Thus, Amar emphasizes 
that the amendment is an example of a “self-imposed” limit on 
Americans’ electoral choices, a restriction “resulting from a 
broadly inclusive democratic process featuring a series of 
extraordinary votes” designed “to prevent entrenchment in 
America’s most powerful office and to promote a healthy 
rotation.”68 Similarly, Ackerman objects to the idea that a 
twice-elected President can serve as Vice President (or 
otherwise serve as President again) on the grounds that the 
Twenty-Second Amendment “represents a considered judgment 
by the American people, after Franklin Roosevelt’s lengthy stay 
in the White House” to limit the President to no more than “two 
elected terms.”69 
This “popular expectations” approach to constitutional 
purposes is not without its challenges. Most obviously, we 
cannot readily identify what the American people believed the 
Twenty-Second Amendment was supposed to accomplish. 
Polling from 1939–1949 indicates, at best, deeply divided public 
opinion on several variations of this question.70 For example, in 
1949, when the Twenty-Second Amendment was making its 
way through the states as part of the ratification process, forty-
nine percent of the public opposed “adding a law to the U.S. 
Constitution to prevent any President of the United States 
from serving a third term” (while forty-three percent approved 
this language).71 It’s not clear how much of this opposition (or 
support) reflects a judgment that the Twenty-Second 
Amendment would prevent people from serving in a third term. 
But even if we stipulate that this is what the public believed, 
 
 68. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 26, 37 (2000). 
 69. ACKERMAN supra note 52, at 204 n.34. 
 70. Among other problems, one should note that this public opinion data 
was measured in a period when reliable polling was still in its infancy. See 
generally BARBARA A. BARDES & ROBERT W. OLDENDICK, PUBLIC OPINION: 
MEASURING THE AMERICAN MIND 18–19 (5th ed. 2016) (discussing the origins 
of the modern polling industry). 
 71. Kathleen Weldon, The Public and the 22nd Amendment: Third Terms 
and Lame Ducks, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/kathleen-weldon/the-public-and-the-22nd-a_b_7967538 
.html; see also Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-Second Amendment: A 
Practical Remedy or Partisan Maneuver?, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 61, 65 (1990) 
(discussing popular attitudes about the Twenty-Second Amendment in the 
years leading up to its proposal). 
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the polling data indicates a popular plurality rejecting this 
purpose. 
The state ratification debates, which could be another 
promising source for information about popular beliefs about 
presidential term limits, don’t furnish much help either. As one 
periodical summarized, the Twenty-Second Amendment “glided 
through legislatures in a fog of silence—passed by men whose 
election in no way involved their stand on the question—
without hearings, without publicity, without any of that 
popular participation that should have accompanied a change 
in the organic law of the country.”72 
In summary, what can we conclude about the intended 
purposes of the Twenty-Second Amendment? Does a purposive 
approach (whether informed by the amendment’s proximate 
historical context, relevant legislative history, or popular 
understandings) allow us to circumvent or at least supplement 
a plain words reading of the amendment? If not, don’t we run 
the risk of allowing “a president who is barred from an honest 
reelection to become president through some ponderous 
constitutional convolution?”73 
But instead of offering a choice between “common sense” 
understandings and the worst of academic casuistry, these 
questions point instead to a values dilemma: an irreducible 
tradeoff between our commitment to constitutional text and 
constitutional purposes. The decision to set aside a textual 
command in favor of purposes (assuming we can identify them) 
must be weighed on several scales, including measures of the 
clarity of the text, how confidently we can construe a purpose at 
odds with that language, and the legal and political 
consequences at stake in one interpretation versus another.74 A 
purpose-based analysis may help a legal interpreter sift 
through multiple plausible readings of a law, or it may assist 
 
 72. The Two-Term Limit, NATION, Mar. 10, 1951, at 216–17; see also 
LOUIS W. KOENIG, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 65 (1964) (the Twenty-Second 
Amendment’s “four-year journey through the state legislatures stirred a 
minimum of public discussion”). 
 73. KALT, supra note 43, at 144. 
 74. See Peabody & Gant, supra note 8, at 614 (discussing problems in 
discerning the “legislative history” of a constitutional amendment). For a 
discussion of the relative merits and disadvantages of executive term limits, 
see generally Tom Ginsburg, James Melton, & Zachary Elkins, On the Evasion 
of Executive Term Limits, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1807 (2011) (noting that 
sufficient popularity enables executives to ignore term limits by amending or 
replacing constitutional provisions imposing them). 
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us in deciding that our adherence to legal language needs to be 
set aside in favor of other trumping values. But deviations from 
text come with a cost. The purported advantages of textual 
analysis include accountability (that is, knowing something 
about who the authors of a law are), clarity of guidance, 
limiting judicial discretion, and stability.75 
It is beyond the scope of this essay to engage in a 
thoroughgoing analysis of the text-purpose tradeoff in general, 
or how we might reconcile it in the complicated case of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment specifically. Nevertheless, given 
the seeming lack of ambiguity in the amendment’s language (a 
point conceded by several defenders of purposive readings of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment) and the comparatively equivocal 
and mixed goals of the amendment’s contemporaneous 
supporters, it seems reasonable to put the burden on purpose-
impelled skeptics to explain why a twice-elected President is 
ineligible to serve again.76 
III.  MAJOR NEW OBJECTIONS BY CRITICS AND 
RESPONSES   
As we have seen, the original “Twice and Future President” 
article anticipated some of the major lines of criticism that 
were raised after the piece was published. Specifically, these 
objections were based on the purported limiting effects of the 
Twelfth Amendment on the Twenty-Second Amendment, and 
various readings of the Twenty-Second Amendment’s true 
purposes. But nothing in these claims seems sufficient to 
overturn the article’s original conclusion: on balance, neither 
the Constitution’s eligibility provisions nor the best efforts to 
ascertain the purposes and functions of the amendment bar a 
twice-elected President from again seeking the office through 
 
 75. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 25–38 (1982) (reviewing textual argument and some of its 
advantages); SUE DAVIS, CORWIN AND PELTASON’S UNDERSTANDING THE 
CONSTITUTION 31–38 (17th ed. 2007) (reviewing different approaches to 
constitutional interpretation including textualism); see also KALT, supra note 
43, at 140 (arguing that the authors of the Twenty-Second Amendment were 
keenly aware of how, especially in the context of constitutional amendments, 
they would need to weigh and select every word carefully). 
 76. As Coenen notes, “the framers of the Twenty-Second Amendment” 
tried to strike a balance between their competing worries about entrenching 
the power of one figure through extended occupation of the presidency and 
“stripping away the longstanding prerogatives of the American electorate” to 
select their Chief Executive. Coenen, supra note 21, at 1311. 
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means other than presidential reelection. However, over the 
past decade or so, scholars have raised other and more novel 
objections, and these deserve to be taken seriously as well. 
A. THE PRESIDENT IN WAITING RESTRICTION 
We might begin with a somewhat truncated argument 
offered by judge and scholar Richard Posner. Posner has 
argued that “read literally, the Twenty-Second Amendment” 
allows former Presidents to serve as Vice Presidents.77 But he 
also advances an alternate reading of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment in which its restrictions on persons “elected to the 
office of the President more than twice” apply to any person 
elected to the vice presidency who subsequently takes office as 
President, since such a person is elected to the vice presidency 
with the presumption of being able to serve in the office of 
President.78 As Posner puts it, “Electing a vice president means 
electing a vice president and contingently electing him as 
president. That interpretation, though a little bold, would 
honor the intention behind the Twenty-Second Amendment.”79 
In other words, a twice-elected President could not serve as 
Vice President through election, because such a person would 
be elected to the vice presidency and contingently elected 
President at the same time (violating the provisions of the 
Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments). 
Posner’s interpretation that a Vice President is elected as 
“President in Waiting” is characteristically creative, and 
reflects the important recognition that the Vice President and 
President are paired as the only two officials elected by the 
nation as a whole. It may also implicitly acknowledge that the 
office of Vice President has often been seen as somewhat 
politically and legally hollow, only truly meaningful if 
permanent or temporary succession to the presidency is 
required. 
That said, the “President in Waiting” reading of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment’s application to the vice presidency 
suffers from several flaws. To begin with, one might note that 
the vice presidency is an official office to which a person is 
elected. Vice Presidents possess official and unofficial functions 
besides being able to take over as President. Most notably, the 
 
 77. Baker, supra note 16 (quoting an email message from Judge Posner). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
  
2016] TWICE & FUTURE PRESIDENT REVISITED 143 
 
Vice President serves as President of the Senate, breaking ties 
in that body.80 Seen in this light, when voting for Vice 
President, the public doesn’t just cast its ballots for a 
“President in Waiting,” but for a particular constitutional 
officer. This point somewhat undermines Posner’s contention 
that the Twenty-Second Amendment’s prohibition of any 
person being “elected to the office of the President more than 
twice” includes both Presidents elected to the office and Vice 
Presidents elected to a separate office who subsequently 
become President or act as President. 
Furthermore, the terms of the Constitution (and 
specifically the Twelfth, Twenty-Second, and Twenty-Fifth 
Amendments81) do nothing to suggest that a person who 
succeeds to the office of President as an elected Vice President 
has thereby been effectively “elected to the office of President.” 
As Coenen points out, the constitutional text actually “makes it 
clear that such a person is not elected to the office of the 
President, but instead is elected to the office of the Vice-
President, just as common usage would suggest.”82 
Finally, one might note that Posner’s “President in 
Waiting” interpretation of the vice presidency leaves other 
issues unresolved. For example, the argument only seems to 
cover circumstances where a person is elected to the office of 
Vice President as opposed to being nominated (under the terms 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment).83 
 
 80. The participation of the Vice President is also required under the 
terms of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment for declaring that a sitting “President 
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXV, § 4; see also Sanford Levinson, No Vice, BOS. GLOBE, July 1, 2007, at D1 
(discussing the “unprecedented influence” wielded by former Vice President 
Dick Cheney); Scott Shane, Cheney in Dispute on Oversight of His Office, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 22, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/22/washington/22cnd 
-cheney.html (former Vice President Cheney arguing that the office of VP is 
uniquely positioned between the legislative and executive branches). 
 81. For example, the Twelfth Amendment sets out separate procedures 
(including “distinct ballots”) for selecting Presidents and Vice Presidents, and 
the Twenty-Second Amendment explicitly constrains the service of a Vice 
President who holds the office of President or acts as President during a term 
“to which some other person was elected President,” language indicating that 
a President’s conventional selection via election is qualitatively distinct from a 
Vice President’s succession to the presidency. 
 82. Coenen, supra note 21, at 1321–23. 
 83. Also, it isn’t clear how the Posner thesis would apply generally to Vice 
Presidents who succeed to the office of President, including Presidents elected 
to a single term who then serve as Vice President and, subsequently, 
President through succession. Presumably such persons are simply bound by 
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B. A REVERSE READING OF THE TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT 
Besides Posner’s approach, legal researchers have 
identified a second inventive objection to some kinds of three-
term Presidents, based on what one might call a “reverse 
reading” of the Twenty-Second Amendment. We have already 
seen how some constitutional scholars have called for 
transcending supposedly cramped, acontextual, “clause-bound” 
analyses of presidential term limits, favoring, instead, a more 
purposive and structural approach. In a different context, Amar 
has advocated for a general “intratextual” orientation, in which 
we eschew reading “the words of the Constitution in order” in 
favor of a more “holistic” conception.84 
This modality for construing constitutional text sets the 
stage for an innovative, almost non-linear reading of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment, one that focuses on the language 
restricting those who have “held the office of President, or acted 
as President, for more than two years of a term to which some 
other person was elected President.”85 The reverse reading 
contends that under these terms, a twice-elected President is 
only eligible to become President or act as President through 
non-electoral means for two years or less in a given term begun 
by a different, elected President. 
Read in a straightforward way, the language of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment anticipates that some who succeed 
to the presidency (through non-electoral means) will hold the 
office, or act as President for a time, but may still seek to gain 
the office again by election. Such persons are limited to one 
elected term if they held the presidency (“or acted as 
President”) for “more than two years of a term to which some 
other person was elected.”86 
But suppose that after two elected terms, a former 
President is subsequently elected Vice President. This person 
then becomes President after, say, the elected President dies, a 
 
the “two year rule”—so long as they succeeded to the presidency for two years 
or less, they are eligible to be elected President a total of two times. But this 
view seems in some tension with the idea that a twice-elected President is 
barred from being elected as VP because doing so elects her as a President in 
Waiting. Why isn’t a President elected to one term and subsequently elected 
VP also an elected President in Waiting (and therefore restricted under the 
Twenty-Second Amendment even if she serves as President through 
succession for only one day)? 
 84. Amar, supra note 27, at 788. 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 86. Id. 
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few months into the new term. Under these circumstances, can 
we sensibly claim that the Twenty-Second Amendment places a 
two-year cap on the successor President’s service? After all, as 
soon as this individual serves for more than two years of a term 
to which some other person was elected, hasn’t she violated the 
amendment’s language that says such persons shall not “be 
elected to the office of the President more than once”?87 Is this 
successor President, therefore, obliged to step down after two 
years? 
Coenen offers two main reasons why this reverse reading 
of the Twenty-Second Amendment is troublesome. First, he 
notes that the different tenses in the Amendment imply that it 
applies to a President “who has [previously] held the office of 
President, or acted as President, for more than two years” of 
another’s term who “thereafter” is elected to the Office.88 In 
other words, the sequence of this language seems to go one 
way: governing only those who obtain the office through non-
electoral means but then seek election. 
Coenen’s second point is that a reverse reading of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment can have strange policy and 
political implications. After all, it could require a “successor 
President to step down in the middle of a four-year term—
indeed, in the middle of a four-year term during which one 
hand-off of the presidency had already occurred—thus 
thrusting a third President into a single, four-year period of 
service.”89 Such an outcome would be “disruptive of government 
operations, and so fraught with peril for the nation that the 
framers of the Twenty-Second Amendment could not have 
envisioned it.”90 We might add to Coenen’s arguments by noting 
that this obligatory departure would be curious insofar as its 
closest analogies (mandatory intra-term removal of Presidents 
occurs only through impeachment, resignation, disability, or 
death) possess a much different character (since they deal with 
emergencies and unforeseen and unavoidable events). 
 
 87. See Coenen, supra note 21, at 1327–89 (discussing what he calls “the 
two-years-only-succession-right interpretation”). See generally Bruce G. 
Peabody, Reversing Time’s Arrow: Law’s Reordering of Chronology, Causality, 
and History, 40 AKRON L. REV. 587 (2007) (discussing problems with 
chronology and the law). 
 88. Coenen, supra note 21, at 1329 (emphasis in original). 
 89. Id. at 1330 (emphasis added). 
 90. Id. at 1330. 
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A final obvious objection is to note that “reverse readings” 
are not the standard ways of understanding sentence 
construction, and can lead to perverse (and clearly incorrect) 
outcomes in other contexts. The proposition that “[n]o one who 
commits a felony shall be allowed to vote” is a relatively 
straightforward legal rule, but its reverse reading (something 
like: “If you are allowed to vote, you shall not commit a felony”) 
is neither the intended purpose nor coherent. The reverse 
reading of the Twenty-Second Amendment seems open to a 
similar critique. 
C. THE TRANSITIONS CLAUSE OBJECTION 
In addition to both the “President in Waiting” argument 
and the “reverse” reading of the Twenty-Second Amendment’s 
restrictions, the amendment’s concluding “Transitions Clause” 
has been a source of imaginative new arguments against the 
possibility of three-term Presidents. Specifically, the 
transitions language of the Twenty Second Amendment holds 
that: 
[T]his article shall not apply to any person holding the office of 
President when this article was proposed by the Congress, and shall 
not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or 
acting as President, during the term within which this article 
becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as 
President during the remainder of such term.91 
These provisions do two things: first, they effectively 
exempted the President sitting at the time the amendment was 
proposed (Harry Truman) from the law’s restrictions. More 
important for the purposes of this essay, the text’s subsequent 
and rather encompassing language (which references both 
individuals “holding” the office or “acting” as President) seems 
to anticipate various ways through which someone might 
assume the presidency, including through non-electoral means. 
In the judgment of scholars like Amar, such comprehensive 
language wouldn’t be necessary if the rest of the Twenty-
Second Amendment only restricted presidential elections.92 
Stated differently, why would the Transitions Clause give 
special protection to “acting” Presidents (which might include 
Vice Presidents who have temporarily taken over the duties of 
an elected President) if these figures weren’t otherwise 
restricted under the terms of the Twenty-Second Amendment? 
 
 91. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
 92. AMAR, supra note 30, at 436 n.8. 
  
2016] TWICE & FUTURE PRESIDENT REVISITED 147 
 
As Coenen summarizes: 
[T]here would be no reason to give a Vice-President-turned-President, 
who had twice before been elected President, special dispensation to 
serve ‘the remainder’ of the ratification term unless the operative 
terms of the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments otherwise 
foreclosed such a person from becoming Vice-President and thereby 
assuming the rights and duties of that office, as a general rule.93 
At first blush, this seems like a substantial blow against 
the analysis and conclusions advanced in the original “Twice 
and Future President” piece. However, several points limit the 
damage done by this “transitions” argument. First, there are 
good reasons to think that the transitions language in the 
Twenty-Second Amendment is distinct and stands on its own 
from the rest of the text’s provisions.94 Indeed, the language of 
the Twenty-Second Amendment seems to apply distinctly to 
three different groups of people. The first is comprised of the 
sitting President at the time the amendment was proposed (as 
noted, Truman is exempted from the Twenty-Second 
Amendment). The second group consists of anyone serving as 
President (through election or other means) during the 
presidential term when the amendment goes into effect. The 
individuals in this second group (the elected President at the 
time of ratification, or any person acting as President or who 
became President during this term) are allowed to finish their 
term even if the Twenty-Second Amendment would otherwise 
restrict them. And the third group, then, represents every other 
subsequent President. 
This approach, based on understanding the “transitions” 
language as limited to the first and second groups of 
Presidents, sequesters the Transitions Clause from the rest of 
the Twenty-Second amendment. Such a construction is 
supported by both the explicit language of the amendment 
(which establishes unique rules for each group), as well as the 
sequence in which these words appear. In order for Amar’s 
“transitions” argument to apply, we would have to assume that 
“the drafters of the Twenty-Second Amendment somehow 
meant to set forth a [general,] functionally problematic 
restriction” in a transition clause at the very end of the 
Amendment, rather than at the outset, where the basic terms 
of the Amendment are presented.95 One might plausibly 
 
 93. Coenen, supra note 21, at 1315. 
 94. Id. at 1326. 
 95. Id. at 1343. 
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criticize such a reading as one where the Transition Clause’s 
“tail” wags the “dog” constituted by the rest of the amendment. 
As Coenen puts it, “transition clauses themselves do not 
establish operative rules” but only rules regarding “the 
transition period itself.”96 In contrast, Amar’s approach to the 
Twenty-Second Amendment arguably privileges the Transition 
Clause at the expense of both the core language of the Twenty-
Second Amendment and the drafting lawmakers’ focus on 
limiting elected Presidents. 
D. JURISPRUDENTIAL PRAGMATISM AND THREE-TERM 
PRESIDENTS 
One can identify a final set of new arguments made 
against the basic conclusions of the original “Twice and Future 
President.” While not consistently pursued, some analyses of 
the Twenty Second Amendment implicitly or briefly draw on 
variants of jurisprudential pragmatism in criticizing the three-
term presidency thesis.97 Such pragmatic approaches weigh 
heavily the legal and political implications of interpreting a law 
or favor consequentialist considerations in helping to select 
between several plausible readings of legal language. As Posner 
famously articulated, for a judicial pragmatist, “[I]f one 
possible interpretation of an ambiguous statement would entail 
absurd or terrible results, that is a good reason to reject it.”98 
Pragmatic interpretations of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment might focus on the potential deleterious effects of 
permitting individuals to serve as President for more than two 
terms. These outcomes might include entrenching executive 
power and imbalancing the separation of powers. Further, if 
one believes that the Twenty-Second Amendment (and the 
 
 96. Id. at 1327, 1336. 
 97. See, e.g., KALT, supra note 43, at 138 (discussing how “voters’ policy 
preferences” and considerations of “political expedience” would matter a great 
deal in applying the Twenty-Second Amendment to the problem of three-term 
Presidents); Coenen, supra note 21, at 1326 (discussing the importance of 
“practical problems” in interpreting the Twenty-Second Amendment including 
concerns about “destabilizing uncertainty and political gamesmanship as to 
what person might come to occupy the highest office in the land”). 
 98. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 234 (1995). As we’ve already 
seen, Coenen relies on a pragmatist argument in opining that compelling a 
President to step down in the midst of a term (required under the “reverse 
reading” approach to the Twenty-Second Amendment) would be so “odd,” so 
politically unsettling, and so perilous for the nation that it must be rejected. 
Coenen, supra note 21, at 1330. 
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Constitution as a whole) technically allows for a third-term 
President, one might still disfavor this interpretation on the 
grounds that much of the public and many political leaders 
would reject or question this viewpoint. This need not simply be 
a matter of “knuckling under” to public opinion, but a 
recognition that in our political order, the voices of “We The 
People” have always been powerful determinants in shaping 
the effective meaning of our highest law.99 Even if a twice-
elected President determines that the weight of all other 
evidence suggests she can serve as Vice President, she might 
conscientiously choose not to do so if convinced that most 
people hold a different view of not just the political wisdom but 
the constitutional propriety of such a move. Stated differently, 
the public’s views are likely to form an outer boundary of what 
our constitutional politics will permit. 
In the face of such opposition, a legal pragmatist might be 
concerned that a nation facing a three-term President might 
also experience de facto uncertainty about who has authority to 
act as Commander in Chief or even some delegitimization to 
our political institutions and the rule of law (with opponents of 
the “twice and future President” argument dismissing it as a 
kind of lawyerly “trick” that runs against common sense). 
These are serious concerns. Three factors, however, make 
the pragmatist argument difficult to apply to the circumstances 
considered in this essay. To begin with, a meaningful 
evaluation of the consequences of a third term presidency is 
likely to require case-specific analysis.100 An unpopular former 
Chief Executive who is elevated to the presidency without 
widespread support and by “accident” (perhaps this person was 
 
 99. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC 
OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2009) (discussing how “the American people came to 
understand and then to shape the role played by the justices, thus defining the 
terms of their own constitutional democracy”); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 29–34 
(2004) (describing the American “customary” or “popular” view of 
constitutional law in which “constitutional interpretation and enforcement 
were left to the community”). 
 100. Judicial pragmatism can involve either general or specific legal 
judgments. We can say that the reference to “He” in Article II, Section 1, 
should not be understood to limit the presidency to men either because it 
would entail the ridiculous and impermissible result that women would be 
excluded from the presidency or in noting that such an interpretation would 
set aside the popular judgment of the people if they, say, elected Hillary 
Clinton as President. 
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named in a presidential succession statute) raises a 
substantially different pragmatist assessment than a scenario 
where a victorious President-elect dies, but only after selecting 
a respected twice-elected Vice President as running mate (a 
choice that is explicitly sanctioned by the public through, say, 
an electoral college landslide). 
The second, related observation is that the “absurd or 
terrible” legal and political outcomes pragmatists seek to avoid 
can be difficult to measure, especially longitudinally. When 
initially announced, Miranda v. Arizona (1966)101 mandated 
unpopular constitutional rules that were broadly opposed by 
law enforcement personnel, lawmakers, a majority of the 
public, and even some judges.102 Some of these figures declared 
that the Miranda rules would hamper law enforcement efforts 
and lead to a dramatic rise in crime.103 By 2000, however, public 
opinion overwhelmingly supported the ruling and it had 
famously “become embedded in routine police practice to the 
point where the warnings . . . [were] part of our national 
culture.”104 Our abstract and acontextual assessments about the 
consequences of allowing a twice-elected President to serve 
again must recognize that even strongly held views about the 
legitimacy of laws (and their effects) can shift dramatically over 
time. 
The third, closely related point is simply to observe that 
jurisprudential pragmatists, especially those making 
assessments from the relative isolation and insulation of the 
bench, should exhibit humility regarding their capacity for 
political and consequential judgment; this is an area where 
courts should generally defer to the views of elected officials, 
 
 101. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 102. MATTHEW E. K. HALL, THE NATURE OF SUPREME COURT POWER 61–71 
(2010) (reviewing reactions to Miranda and scholarship on its implementation 
and impact). 
 103. See, e.g., Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 1120 (1967) (statement of New York 
County District Attorney Frank Hogan). 
 104. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000); Bruce Peabody, 
Fifty Years Later the Miranda Decision Hasn’t Accomplished What the 
Supreme Court Intended, WASH. POST: THE MONKEY CAGE (June 13, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/13/your 
-miranda-rights-are-50-years-old-today-heres-how-that-decision-has-aged 
(contending that while the decision was “widely unpopular when first handed 
down . . . abundant evidence shows that over the years, the basic Miranda 
rules were accepted by society”). 
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policymakers, and voters. With respect to the issues considered 
in this essay, there’s no reason to think that judicial and legal 
expertise make judges especially capable of weighing the long 
term outcomes of permitting or forbidding a person from 
serving as President in a third term. There surely are areas of 
law where judges are better positioned for these sorts of policy 
determinations. In evaluating the impact of the Miranda 
warnings, for example, judges had many iterative opportunities 
to ascertain the decision’s effects and weigh these with 
standards and metrics courts were familiar and comfortable 
using (such as the rates at which confessions were thrown out). 
But sui generis judgments about what will happen if we allow, 
say, President Obama to serve as Vice President is not the kind 
of subject within the ken of most jurists, because it raises so 
many unfamiliar and speculative questions about political 
legitimacy and effectiveness. 
IV.  BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREE-TERM 
PRESIDENTS THESIS   
Since 1999, a small but serious-minded group of 
researchers have considered whether twice-elected Presidents 
can once again serve as the nation’s Chief Executive by pushing 
their way through various interstices in our supreme law.105 
These scholars have reviewed and engaged past debates on this 
question, and introduced new lines of inquiry, but have not 
achieved much agreement about the Constitution’s strictures 
regarding presidential service.106 This absence of consensus, 
together with the conclusions of prominent political figures 
(including both Clintons) that twice-elected Presidents cannot 
again serve in the office of President places a heavy burden on 
those arguing to the contrary.107 Indeed, unsettled legal terrain 
 
 105. See Baker, supra note 16 (discussing how the prospect of Vice 
President Bill Clinton generates disagreement amongst scholars, judges, and 
lawyers); Spivak, supra note 14 (noting that scholars disagree about the 
application of the Constitution to a potential Clinton vice presidency). 
 106. See Baker, supra note 16 (discussing the “simmering disagreement on 
whether a president who has already served two terms can be vice president”). 
 107. When prominent officials like the Clintons express doubts about the 
three-term presidency it creates something of a practical precedent that poses 
an additional challenge for future twice-elected Presidents who wish to serve 
again. As Kalt puts it, “The more that Congress and Presidents reinforce the 
constitutional impropriety of serving more than two terms, the more voters 
will be inclined to vote against a candidate trying to exploit the careless 
loophole left in the Twenty-Second Amendment, and thus the smaller that 
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is not a reassuring surface for someone who would consider 
taking a bold and dramatic step back to the White House. Nor 
is it comfortable footing for a nation that needs to have 
unstinting confidence in the authority, legitimacy, and power of 
its Commander in Chief. 
So, stated somewhat differently, aren’t the stakes simply 
too high to entertain seriously the arguments advanced in both 
the original “Twice and Future President” piece as well as this 
updated essay? And if that’s the case, what’s the broader 
purpose of this inquiry? What makes it something “more than 
an academic diversion?”108 
The first point to note in this regard is that however 
unlikely the circumstances outlined in this essay seem to be at 
the moment, politics, even constitutional politics, can be a 
dynamic and even fickle enterprise. The remarkable post-Civil 
War expansion of black voting power and civil rights was 
impelled by outright military surrender, the Reconstruction 
Amendments, and a vigilant and motivated Republican party.109 
In less than a generation, however, party interests shifted and 
much of this progress was undone.110 The jurisprudential gap 
between Bowers v. Hardwick (denying “a fundamental right 
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy”)111 and Obergefell v. 
Hodges (extending Fourteenth Amendment protections to 
“personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, 
including intimate choices that define personal identity and 
beliefs”)112 seems vast, but is separated by less than 30 years. 
One can surely identify other instances of relatively rapid legal 
transformations.113 
The potential for change in our future political and legal 
attitudes should, therefore, induce us to think carefully about 
what appear to be seemingly unlikely scenarios today. After all, 
one of the primary purposes of written law is to try to constrain 
imperfectly foreseen events through binding rules. In a similar 
 
loophole will become.” KALT, supra note 43, at 157. 
 108. Albert, supra note 11, at 857. 
 109. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 271–80, 314 (1988). 
 110. Id. at 601–02; WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 
1869–1879 48–55 (1979). 
 111. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). 
 112. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015). 
 113. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 102, at 62 (the public’s constitutional 
judgments about Miranda “change[d] dramatically in the thirty-four years” 
between the initial decision and its most serious challenge in Dickerson). 
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manner, one of the critical drivers of legal interpretation is to 
think through permutations of those rules even when these 
applications seem remote or even unlikely. In short, the 
constitutional problems considered in this essay and in related 
scholarship “could well become real-life problems at some point 
in the future” and, if they do, the nation will be better served by 
having a “thoroughgoing treatment of the legal issues prepared 
outside the maelstrom of an ongoing political crisis.”114 As Kalt 
points out, the most important constitutional problems posed 
by the secession of southern states in 1861, as well as the 
contested presidential elections of 1876 (and 2000) were 
foreseeable, but insufficiently considered by politicians, the 
courts, and the public.115 Surfacing such issues in advance is no 
panacea, but it helps support the rule of law and a political 
order based on “reflection and choice” rather than “accident and 
force.”116 
In the case of the Twenty-Second Amendment, the 
prospects of a third-term President rising on a future political 
horizon is made somewhat more likely by a number of factors. 
Presidents twice-elected to White House are likely to embody 
some impressive combination of ambition, political skill, 
popularity, familiarity, and resourcefulness—traits that could 
incline these individuals to seek the office of President again 
through perceived constitutional loopholes. Moreover, in recent 
years, a number of these figures have been relatively young, 
further inviting speculation about how they might continue to 
serve their country in the years ahead.117 
 
 114. Coenen, supra note 21, at 1291–92. Cf. KALT, supra note 43, at 2 
(“American history is full of . . . constitutional debacles and near misses . . . .”). 
 115. KALT, supra note 43, at 155 (“[D]uring the 2000 election crisis, when it 
still looked like the dispute might not be resolved in time, a New York Times 
op-ed suggested that Congress provide for two-termer Bill Clinton to stay in 
power until the election could be properly resolved.”). 
 116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). The suggestion that thorough and responsible constitutional 
interpretation requires some anticipation of future scenarios, even somewhat 
unlikely ones (from the perspective of the present) is in some admitted tension 
with my prior contention that we should be humble about the judiciary’s 
ability to engage in assessments of political consequences. But the two points 
are certainly not synonymous: a responsible judge should try to anticipate 
different scenarios or events that will make today’s interpretation or 
jurisprudential rule problematic. That point is not quite the same as giving a 
jurist wide latitude to assess the political stakes of one reading over another; 
the first is more of an act of legal imagination while the second involves more 
precise calculations of consequences. 
 117. See Coenen, supra note 21, at 1291 (“At least in the modern era, twice-
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Finally, the rise of hyper-partisanship and with it, the 
ascension of what Mark Tushnet calls “constitutional hardball” 
(constitutionally valid practices that are nevertheless in 
tension with significant political norms and values) may also 
make a three-term President more likely in the twenty-first 
century.118 Future partisans might well seek to use the formal 
rules of the Constitution to advance their candidates and 
policies, even in ways that upset conventional and informal 
understandings of how the nation conducts its political 
business.119 
In sum, future Presidents may well test the limits of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment, and scholarship like this essay 
will help us respond. But we can also frame the issue more 
positively and proactively: there are good policy reasons to 
explore the prospects of a three-term President. The most 
obvious application involves presidential succession, giving rise 
to questions about whether we should reform our existing laws 
governing who is to serve as Commander in Chief should both 
the sitting President and Vice President die or become disabled. 
In recent decades these questions have taken on some added 
urgency in light of ongoing concerns about terrorism and 
maintaining “continuity in government” during crises or 
attacks on our highest leaders.120 
 
serving Presidents have remained in the prime of life upon leaving office, 
while the forward march of medical science ensures that human lifespans will 
grow longer and longer.”). Both Bill Clinton and Barack Obama will have been 
55 at the time they left office following their second term. 
 118. Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
523, 553 (2004) (describing constitutional hardball as “political claims and 
practices—legislative and executive initiatives—that are without much 
question within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and practice but 
that are nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-constitutional 
understandings”). 
 119. In the context of the Twenty-Second Amendment, one might note that 
the alleged “two term” tradition upon which the amendment is founded is 
much more tentative and uneven than usually presented. See Peabody, supra 
note 56. 
 120. See generally John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, If Terrorists 
Attacked our Presidential Elections, 3 ELECTION L.J. 597 (2004) (identifying 
potential terrorism targets during the American election cycle); Robert E. 
Gilbert, The Contemporary Presidency: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: 
Recommendations and Deliberations of the Working Group on Presidential 
Disability, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 877 (2003) (discussing the Clinton-era 
Working Group on Presidential Disability); James C. Ho, Ensuring the 
Continuity of Government in Times of Crisis: An Analysis of the Ongoing 
Debate in Congress, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 1049 (2004) (discussing measures 
necessary to ensure a functioning Congress in the wake of a terrorist attack); 
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Under Article II and the Twentieth Amendment of the 
Constitution, after the Vice President, the order of presidential 
succession is determined by congressional statute. The current 
law, the Succession Act of 1947, stipulates that the Speaker of 
the House and President pro tempore are next in line, followed 
by various cabinet officers in the chronological order in which 
their departments were first established.121 Scholars have 
raised substantial concerns about the constitutionality of the 
Succession Act (on separation of powers and other grounds). 
But even if one sets these admittedly pressing issues aside, it 
should also trouble us that the first two figures named in the 
current statute have no guaranteed national security 
background or executive governing experience, not to mention 
broad public recognition or legitimacy. Is it really optimal to 
put these individuals in immediate proximity to the reins of 
executive authority—particularly since they would most likely 
be tapped under especially trying circumstances? In the 
aftermath of a horrific attack or catastrophic accident, orderly, 
confident, and experienced leadership should be at a premium, 
but these traits might not be supplied by the legislative 
specialists currently at the front of the succession queue. As 
Albert puts it: 
The Speaker of the House and the Senate President pro tempore may 
be schooled in the science of legislation but both are inexpert in the 
art of popular leadership. Neither possesses the presidential timbre 
necessary to pilot the country in the aftermath of an attack nor enjoys 
the democratic legitimacy that only a national election can confer.122 
 
Paul Taylor, Proposals to Prevent Discontinuity in Government and Preserve 
the Right to Elected Representation, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 435 (2004) 
(discussing measures necessary to ensure a continuous government in the 
event of a terrorist attack). 
 121. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012). 
 122. Albert, supra note 6, at 498; see also John C. Fortier & Norman J. 
Ornstein, Presidential Succession and Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 993, 998 (2004) (“For both constitutional and policy reasons, we favor a 
return to a purely executive branch line of succession.”). Of course, a case can 
be made that either a Speaker or Senate Majority leader, who are likely to 
have significant governing experience and the support of a majority of at least 
one congressional chamber, would be superior presidential choices than, say, a 
person low down on the (current successor) list of executive department heads. 
See generally John Manning, Not Proved: Some Lingering Questions About 
Legislative Succession to the Presidency, 48 STAN. L. REV. 141 (1995) 
(challenging the view that the Speaker is a poor succession choice). But my 
argument here is different: a recent, twice-elected President may be a superior 
choice to all of these figures—and should certainly be considered in the mix. 
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On the basis of these and other concerns, Albert proses 
that we revise the succession law to privilege former Presidents 
(in reverse chronological order—that is, starting with whatever 
President was last in office) from the same party as the elected 
but unavailable President. These figures “are the only ones 
equipped with the proven competence, domestic repute, and 
foreign stature needed to pull the United States out of the 
depths of disaster.”123 
Albert specifically contends that twice-elected Presidents 
would not be eligible for his new succession law under the 
terms of the Twenty-Second and Twelfth Amendments. But as 
we have seen, this conclusion is quite likely mistaken on the 
grounds that the Twelfth Amendment’s reference to 
constitutional ineligibility does not obviously extend to twice-
elected Presidents who assume the office of President through 
non-electoral means.124 Indeed, such figures might possess just 
the right mix of relevant experience, political credibility, and 
limited personal ambition to help the nation best in a time of 
trial. 
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL END RUNS 
Almost two decades after the publication of “The Twice and 
Future President,” the weight of legal, historical, and policy 
argument still falls on the side of permitting a twice-elected 
President to lead the executive branch once again. That said, 
there is certainly both scholarly and popular uncertainty about 
this conclusion, and good reasons to think we would benefit 
from greater clarity in this regard. 
So why not just amend the Constitution to obtain closure 
on these issues? As a legal matter, simply changing the 
Twenty-Second Amendment to read “No Person shall serve or 
act as President in more than two terms” would probably 
suffice—regardless of whether this is, in fact, a good policy 
idea.125 
 
 123. Albert, supra note 6, at 499. 
 124. Again, a twice-elected President might obtain the office of President 
not only through succession as Vice President, but also via some more 
presumably attractive position such as, say Secretary of State (through a 
succession statute). 
 125. In 2011, former President Bill Clinton argued that “the 22nd 
Amendment should probably be modified to say two consecutive terms instead 
of two terms for a lifetime because we’re all living longer.” Live from the 
Headlines (CNN television broadcast May 28, 2003), http://transcripts.cnn 
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The problem with this approach is that the U.S. 
Constitution is extraordinarily difficult to change.126 This is 
true not only because the enduring formal rules of amendment 
require comparatively demanding supermajority thresholds, 
but also as a historical matter: it is harder to enact Article V 
constitutional changes in the twenty-first century.127 While 
Darren Patrick Guerra notes that the Constitution has been 
amended on average once every 8.2 years, if one takes out the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment (which was ratified over the 
course of more than two centuries), no amendment has been 
ratified for the past 44 years.128 Again, some of this difficulty 
can be attributed to rising partisanship within government, 
and the resulting unwillingness of leaders and rank and file 
officials to identify the broadly shared ground needed for 
constitutional revision. Our current ideological and party divide 
is exacerbated by invariant features of American politics, such 
as our complex separation of powers system, which includes 
divisions between and within state and federal authority.129 
Of course, the difficulty of changing the American 
Constitution isn’t automatically troubling. Indeed, for much of 
our history, the relative immutability of our supreme law was 
seen as a signature strength of our republic.130 Among other 
 
.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0305/28/se.12.html. 
 126. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 261 (Sanford Levinson ed. 1995) (presenting an 
Index of Difficulty which shows that the U.S. Constitution is the second 
hardest to change in a survey of 30 nations). 
 127. STEVEN L. TAYLOR, MATTHEW S. SHUGART, AREND LIJPHART, & 
BERNARD GROFMAN, A DIFFERENT DEMOCRACY: THE US IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 79–80 (2014) (making the case that the U.S. Constitution’s 
formal amendment process make it one of the most “rigid” amongst 
comparable democracies). 
 128. DARREN PATRICK GUERRA, PERFECTING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CASE 
FOR THE ARTICLE V AMENDMENT PROCESS (2013). For a discussion of the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, see Sanford Levinson, Authorizing 
Constitutional Text: On the Purported Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 11 CONST. 
COMMENT. 101 (1994) (discussing the amendment’s “uncertain status”). 
 129. See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN 
WORSE THAN IT LOOKS 163 (2012) (discussing how our separation of powers 
system does not comport well with our current era of polarized parties but 
concluding that “major constitutional restructuring” is a “purely academic” 
fantasy); Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Towards a Unifying Theory of 
the Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2003) (discussing the “the 
fractured ways in which political authority is distributed between various 
institutions of governance”). 
 130. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
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benefits, such a stable governing charter helps protect against 
political “overreaction to more immediate impulses of the 
moment.”131 Moreover, courts and other public officials have 
devised alternate, non-Article V mechanisms for effectively 
changing the meaning of the Constitution, with constitutional 
interpretation and reliance on case precedents as some of the 
most prominent of these mechanisms.132 
In more recent years, however, scholars from diverse 
substantive and ideological backgrounds have been making a 
different case. In the eyes of these thinkers, our constitutional 
stability has become a troubling stasis that undermines core 
values (like our commitment to democracy),133 is “inadequate to 
the demands of twenty-first-century America,”134 and at least 
partly impedes our capacity to address pressing policy issues of 
a national and international scope, such as climate change.135 
Sanford Levinson has gone so far as to call the Article V 
process for amending our supreme law the “worst single part” 
of an “imbecilic” Constitution, that contributes to a 
“dysfunctional, even pathological” politics.136 Thomas Mann and 
 
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371 (1997) (law’s 
primary purpose is “to settle authoritatively what is to be done” to foster social 
and political stability); Sonia Mittal and Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional 
Stability and the Deferential Court, 13 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 337, 338 (2010) 
(describing U.S. constitutional stability as “unique in the world”). 
 131. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: 
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 132. See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States 
Constitution Been Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for 
Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed. 1995). As 
Brian Kalt points out, it is likely that the abundance of non-Article V changes 
to the Constitution have decreased the perceived urgency for formal 
constitutional amendment and, conversely, that the difficulty of formal legal 
change encourages experimentation with non-Article V mechanisms. E-mail 
from Brian C. Kalt, Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of 
Law to Bruce G. Peabody, Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson 
University (Aug. 3, 2016, 17:41 EST) (on file with author). 
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(2008). 
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Normal Ornstein emphasize, instead, a debilitating “mismatch 
between parliamentary-style political parties” and our 
enduring constitutional “separation-of-powers system that 
makes it extremely difficult for majorities to work their will.”137 
Overall, they lament, this combination results in a destructive 
loyalty to party over country, putting us “at risk because of an 
inability to govern effectively.”138 
Assuming these critics of constitutional inertia are right,139 
what is the way out of this tricky dilemma? How do we solve 
the puzzle of a nation facing pressing political problems while 
its constitutional order (both the constitutional text itself and 
the prevailing views about how it should be interpreted) 
represents a significant barrier to needed reforms and policy 
innovation? 
This essay’s analysis of the Twenty-Second Amendment 
suggests a possible, difficult way forward. We might use the 
three-term President as a kind of case study of a wider 
phenomenon: constitutional end runs. These represent efforts 
to circumvent and even subvert widely accepted 
understandings of what the Constitution means in favor of 
more unconventional and even idiosyncratic readings, often by 
exploiting inconsistencies or interstices in the constitutional 
text. 
One can think of a constitutional end run as a kind of 
variation of what Stephen L. Carter has identified as a 
constitutional “impropriety.”140 According to Carter, a 
constitutional impropriety is a government act that is not 
forbidden by the Constitution (and the prevailing 
interpretations of that document) but which is nevertheless 
“contrary to the spirt of the document, as reflected in the 
document’s history and in its role in the constitutional story 
 
05/28/our-imbecilic-constitution. 
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constitutional dysfunction thesis, and either argue that our contemporary 
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the Constitution and its resistance to change. See generally What Do We Talk 
About When We Talk About the Constitution?, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 1119, 1132 
(2013) (with Akhil Reed Amar) (concluding that we shouldn’t “blame the 
Constitution for most of our problems”). 
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Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357 
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that We the People of the United States, tell about ourselves.”141 
In a sense, a constitutional impropriety involves a legally valid 
act that is still regrettable from the perspective of our most 
cherished constitutional values. 
In contrast, a constitutional end run involves a 
controversial constitutional interpretation, perhaps even an 
application that many (or most) would find troublesome, 
flawed, or even wrong. Unlike a constitutional impropriety, 
these constructions of our supreme law push the envelope of 
accepted understandings of how the Constitution works. At the 
same time, however, end runs (at least when they are 
defensible) advance important values immanent in our 
constitutional order, or help secure vital policy and political 
goals that are otherwise unattainable. 
Arguably, the Twenty-Second Amendment142 could provide 
the opportunity for such an end run. Allowing a popular twice-
elected President to run again for the White House (as, say, 
Vice President) would, obviously, serve democratic values 
insofar as the public would have an opportunity to select (or 
reject) a person otherwise blocked through traditional 
presidential election channels (under the terms of the Twenty-
Second Amendment). We can also imagine more specific cases 
where a twice-elected President might be tapped through a vice 
presidential selection or even an amended succession statute to 
help stabilize an administration beset with scandal or at least 
serve as a trusted placeholder until the next election.143 
Something similar might occur if a presidential election is 
 
 141. Id. at 392. 
 142. There are surely other areas of constitutional politics where we can 
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president argument advanced in this essay is likely to be widely perceived as 
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blocking a twice-elected president on the grounds that this would pose a 
significant danger to our constitutional order. Such an analysis might say 
something to the effect of, “Yes, everyone knows the Twenty-Second 
Amendment permits a twice-elected President to serve as Vice President, but 
permitting this would damage the valuable principle of rotation in office and 
otherwise encourage a concentration of executive power.” 
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disputed (such as occurred in 2000), and the nation needs a 
trusted, experienced figure to serve as a stand in until the 
relevant legal and political questions are resolved. 
It is well beyond the purview of this essay to explore fully 
the implications of identifying and promoting constitutional 
end runs. Surely some of these maneuvers could be dangerous 
and pose threats to the rule of law or to political institutions 
and constitutional practices we hold dear. But other end runs 
could help us address real problems and enact needed changes 
by effectively skirting constitutional constraints that seem 
ossified, unworkable, and resistant to formal change—
beginning with the amendment process itself. If successful and 
ultimately supported, such end runs might even become widely 
accepted over time, generating a new norm of accepted 
constitutional practice. 
A constitutional order refashioned with such legal bypasses 
should make us uncomfortable. It threatens to create a kind of 
constitutional Rube Goldberg machine, a construction that may 
break down, and is constantly in danger of inviting charges of 
illegitimacy and obfuscation. We the People probably deserve 
better. But in a nation wracked with party division, policy 
discord, and inherited “Tudor institutions,”144 this may be the 
best way to balance our commitment to the traditional rule of 
constitutional law with new and pressing imperatives for 
change. 
 
 144. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Modernization: America vs. Europe, 
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institutions were still partially medieval in character.”). 
